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Abstract
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a
single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times
and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the
dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either
when the traffic is controlled by a planner, or when players act selfishly. In parallel networks,
optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincides, but the selfish behavior of the first
players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations. In
more general topologies, our main contributions are three-fold.
First, we show that equilibria are usually not unique. In particular, we prove that there
exists a sequence of networks such that the price of anarchy is equal to n− 1, where n is the
number of vertices, and the price of stability is equal to 1.
Second, we illustrate a new dynamic version of Braess’s paradox: the presence of initial
queues in a network may decrease the long-run costs in equilibrium. This paradox may arise
even in networks for which no Braess’s paradox was previously known.
Third, we propose an extension to model seasonalities by assuming that departure flows
fluctuate periodically over time. We introduce a measure that captures the queues induced by
periodicity of inflows. This measure is the increase in costs compared to uniform departures
for optimal and equilibrium flows in parallel networks.
Keywords: Network games, dynamic flows, price of seasonality, price of anarchy, max-flow
min-cut.
OR/MS Subject Classification: networks/graphs: multicommodity, theory; games/group
decisions: noncooperative; transportation: models, network.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of transportation networks naturally leads to the consideration of congestion games,
where each agent selfishly behaves as to minimize her own time on the road without regard for the
effects that this behavior has on the other agents’ traveling time. The outcome of the individual
selfish behavior can be compared to the outcome that a social planner would choose. A way of
comparison is, for instance, the price of anarchy (see, e.g. Roughgarden, 2005, 2007, Roughgarden
and Tardos, 2007), namely the ratio of the worst social cost induced by selfish behavior to the
optimal social cost.
Although the motivation for this theory is rooted in the study of traffic flows, most of the existing
literature is actually static. The commonly adopted justification is that the static game represents
the steady state of a dynamic model where the flow over the network is constant over time. Yet,
for determining how the steady state is reached, a careful study of dynamic models is required. As
we shall see, the behavior of agents in the transient phase may have an impact on the long-run
outcome.
In this paper we study a dynamic model of congestion where the players have symmetric and
unsplittable weights. This could be a high-level model for, e.g., traffic network, where each player
is a car in a traffic network, or a telecommunication network, where each player is a data packet.
We characterize the optimal long-run flows and latencies, i.e., the ones induced by a benevolent
long-lived social planner. When the players act selfishly in order to minimize their own traveling
time, without heeding the planner’s suggestion, the situation can be modeled as a noncooperative
game. For some topologies of the network and when the inflow of players is uniform over time we
are able to characterize the equilibria of this game. We consider the efficiency of its equilibria for
various topologies and we show that some forms of Braess-type paradoxes are possible. Finally we
devote our attention to the case where the inflow of players is periodic over time.
1.1 Model
We analyze an atomic dynamic congestion game, based on the deterministic queuing model of
Koch and Skutella (2011). Atomic models are typically more complicated to analyze than nonatomic
models and have less nice properties. Nevertheless, they may be a better fit when the number of
players is not huge and a nonatomic approximation is not justifiable. Atomic models have been
used, for instance, in telecommunications (see, for instance, Tekin, Liu, Southwell, Huang, and
Ahmad, 2012). The dynamics of the model is described as follows. Time is discrete and at each
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stage, a generation of finitely many players departs from the source with the goal of reaching the
destination as fast as possible. We assume that each player has a unit weight and is unsplittable.
We see this assumption of symmetry as a first order approximation when the size of the vehicles
or of the data packet is not too dissimilar. Each player chooses a route from source to destination,
knowing the choice of the previous players. Each edge of the network is endowed with a free-flow
transit time and a capacity. When a player enters an edge on the chosen route, she travels on that
edge at a constant speed. When reaching the head of the edge, a queue might have formed since
at most the capacity number of players can exit the edge at the same time. We assume that there
is a global priority among players to determine who leaves the edge first. The latency suffered by
the player on an edge is thus the sum of the transit and waiting times. The total latency suffered
by the player is then the sum of the latencies suffered on all the edges she uses.
1.2 Results
We first study social optimality when the inflow is constant and at most the capacity of the
network. We prove that optimal flows exist and show that there is an optimal flow such that, at
each stage, the current flow over routes minimizes the total cost among feasible static flows, i.e.,
the flows that satisfy all the capacity constraints.
Then, we turn to the behavior of selfish players. In particular, we consider equilibria in which each
player arrives at each intermediate vertex as fast as possible. These are called uniformly-fastest-
route equilibria. In general, such equilibria are not unique. For parallel networks, in all equilibria
the flow coincides with the optimal flow from some stage on, and in the worst equilibrium, all
players eventually pay the highest transit cost of the network. The intuition is that the first players
all choose the fastest routes and induce congestion. Eventually, all routes get so congested that
all latencies become equal. This result shows the impact of the dynamic nature of the model on
latencies. While optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincide, the selfish behavior of the
first players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations.
In more general networks the results for equilibrium flows become more complicated. For chain-
of-parallel networks, the equilibrium costs can be derived from the results for parallel networks, but
the corresponding flows can be quite different and even aperiodic.
We also examine various efficiency measures of equilibria such as the price of anarchy, the price
of stability and the Braess ratio. We demonstrate the following phenomena by examples. Firstly,
there is a sequence of instances such that the price of anarchy is equal to n − 1, where n is the
number of vertices, and the price of stability is equal to 1, illustrating the difference in long-run
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equilibrium costs. This is one of the main differences between the atomic and nonatomic cases,
since in our atomic model there may exist multiple equilibria whose behavior can be quite different,
whereas in the nonatomic model, equilibrium is unique (see Cominetti, Correa, and Larre´, 2011).
Koch and Skutella (2011) show that the price of anarchy increases logarithmically in the number
of edges if all edge capacities are equal to 1. As a byproduct of our results, we obtain an example
of a nonatomic game, where all capacities are 1 and the price of anarchy is linear in the number
of edges. Secondly, we study Braess’s paradox (see Braess, 1968, 2005), namely the decrease of the
total equilibrium cost after deletion of an edge. This may happen even when the network does not
contain the Wheatstone graph as a subnetwork (see Macko, Larson, and Steskal, 2013). We also
obtain a variant of Braess’s paradox: the equilibrium cost might decrease when there are initial
queues in the network, or when the length of an edge increases. Thirdly, we study the Braess ratio
(see Roughgarden, 2006), namely, the largest factor by which the equilibrium cost can be improved
by removal of an edge. We consider a set of networks with n vertices where this ratio is n − 1. A
similar result appears in (Macko et al., 2013) in the nonatomic case.
In the last section we consider periodic inflows, we define a distance between two inflows, and we
show that in parallel networks at capacity, periodicity adds the same cost in equilibrium and at the
optimum, and this added cost is exactly the distance between the periodic and the uniform inflows.
1.3 Related literature
Dynamic congestion games belong to the wider class of models of flows over time. Ford and Fulk-
erson (1958, 1962) introduced these models in a discrete time setting by considering the problem of
maximizing the flow from source to destination in a given finite time horizon. Gale (1959) considered
a refinement of the above problem, called earliest arrival flow, where the aim is to simultaneously
maximize the flow for every time before the deadline; Wilkinson (1971) and Minieka (1973) devel-
oped algorithms for solving it. The continuous-time versions were studied by Philpott (1990) and
Fleischer and Tardos (1998), respectively. We refer the reader to Skutella (2009) for a detailed
analysis and an extensive bibliography. Equilibrium concepts in dynamic network models date back
to Vickrey (1969) in the economic literature and to Yagar (1971) in the transportation literature.
We refer the reader to Koch (2012) for an extensive list of references on this topic. Recent mathe-
matical formulations of the model resort to deterministic queueing theory, as introduced originally
by Vickrey (1969) and later developed by Hendrickson and Kocur (1981). In this stream of litera-
ture Akamatsu (2000, 2001), Akamatsu and Heydecker (2003), Mounce (2006, 2007), Anshelevich
and Ukkusuri (2009), Hoefer, Mirrokni, Ro¨glin, and Teng (2009), and especially Koch and Skutella
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(2011) extended some results known for static congestion games to dynamic congestion games. The
latter authors use a deterministic queueing model to study dynamic flows and characterize Nash
equilibria. They show the relation between dynamic and static models and they compute the price
of anarchy for the dynamic model. Along these lines, Cominetti et al. (2011), Cominetti, Correa,
and Larre´ (2015) studied equilibria for flows over time in the single-source single-sink deterministic
queuing model and proved existence and uniqueness of equilibria when the inflow rate is piece-
wise constant. Koch, Nasrabadi, and Skutella (2011) used measure-theoretic techniques to combine
continuous and discrete time models of flow over time and, among other things, extended to this
general setting the classical max-flow min-cut theorem. Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Anshelevich (2015)
considered a Stackelberg model with a network manager acting as a leader who chooses the capacity
of each edge in a way that does not exceed its physical limit. They were able to bound the price of
anarchy for this model.
Among this literature, our model belongs to the class of deterministic queueing models and is
close to the one developed by Koch and Skutella (2011). There are some technical differences
with this literature since our model is in discrete time and with atomic players, similar to Werth,
Holzhauser, and Krumke (2014). This can induce, for instance, a possible multiplicity of equilibria.
Importantly, our focus differs from these papers. Many of them seek to characterize equilibrium
flows (e.g. Koch and Skutella (2011)), prove existence results (see, e.g., Cominetti et al., 2011,
2015), and provide algorithms for computing equilibria. By contrast, we emphasize how the system
evolves towards a steady state. Starting from an empty network, we study how the behavior of the
first users impacts the equilibrium steady state and how this steady state is reached. The transient
phase that leads to the steady state is thus particularly important in our model. Shah and Shin
(2010) consider the transient phase of a dynamic network before a steady state equilibrium is
reached. Although their model is stochastic, some of the questions they consider are close in spirit
to our model. Cominetti (2015) provides a nice survey of congestion models under uncertainty
and describes a model of adaptive dynamics that gives a microfoundation for steady state traffic
equilibrium models.
We now comment on some more accessory features of our work in relation to the existing literature.
Our model belongs to the class of congestion games with atomic players. In his fundamental
paper, Wardrop (1952) modelled the selfish behavior of a huge number of agents on a network as a
nonatomic flow and introduced an equilibrium concept that has become the standard reference in the
literature. Charnes and Cooper (1961) showed the relation between Nash and Wardrop equilibria
and Haurie and Marcotte (1985) proved that, under some conditions, the Wardrop equilibrium in
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a nonatomic model can be obtained as a limit of Nash equilibria of atomic models. The relation
between atomic and nonatomic games has been recently studied by Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Huang
(2010). A nice survey on Wardrop equilibria can be found in Correa and Stier-Moses (2010). General
congestion games with a finite number of players were introduced by Rosenthal (1973), who proved
that they have pure Nash equilibria; they are actually isomorphic to potential games (see Monderer
and Shapley, 1996). The issue of multiplicity of equilibria in atomic congestion games was studied
by Harker (1988), Bhaskar, Fleischer, Hoy, and Huang (2009). Consistent with this literature, we
find multiple equilibria for our game.
In order to obtain well defined dynamics, we use a priority order. This approach can be found in
earlier works. Farzad, Olver, and Vetta (2008) introduced a routing model with a general priority
scheme for players on different edges. This allowed the authors to introduce a time dependence
in the model and to define a cost for each player that depends on the actions of the players with
a higher priority. Among the many possibilities, they considered a global priority scheme which
is the same for every edge, and a time dependent priority scheme where priority is decided by
who arrives first on an edge. A similar global priority scheme was exploited by Harks, Heinz, and
Pfetsch (2009), who studied multicommodity flows where commodities are routed sequentially in a
network. In their model demands for commodities are revealed in an online fashion and can be split
along several paths. They framed the problem as an optimization problem and they studied online
algorithms for its solution. In a related paper, Harks and Ve´gh (2007) considered a model in which
players’ demands change over time and are released in n sequential games in an online fashion.
In each game, the new demands form a Nash equilibrium, and their routing remains unchanged
afterwards. These three models do not explicitly take into account the dynamics of the flows of
players over the network. Our model retains the idea of a priority scheme, but it is dynamic.
Finally, for measuring the efficiency of a game we use the now famous price of anarchy, i.e., the
ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium latency and the socially optimal latency, and the price of
stability, i.e., the ratio between the best Nash equilibrium latency and the socially optimal latency.
These two measures were introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and Schulz and
Stier Moses (2003), respectively. Their names were coined by Papadimitriou (2001) and Anshele-
vich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler, and Roughgarden (2008), respectively. Inefficiency of
equilibria in routing games has been studied by several authors (see among others Roughgarden
and Tardos (2002, 2004), Correa, Schulz, and Stier-Moses (2004, 2008, 2007)).
Braess (1968, 2005) shows that removing an edge in a network can improve the equilibrium
latency for all players in a static model. Daganzo (1998) shows similar paradoxical phenomena in
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traffic models when queues have physical magnitude. Roughgarden (2006) introduces a measure,
called the Braess ratio, that quantifies the extent of Braess’s paradox. A study of the network
topologies for which the paradox may exists can be found in Milchtaich (2006) for static games
and in Macko et al. (2013) for dynamic games. An analysis of a dynamic Braess-type paradox in
communication networks is provided by Xia and Hill (2013).
1.4 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains a charac-
terization of the optimum strategy and cost for the case of constant inflows. Section 4 studies the
case of parallel networks and chain-of-parallel networks. Section 5 examines efficiency of equilibria
and Braess-type phenomena. Section 6 proposes an extension to model seasonalities. Section 7
concludes and proposes some open problems. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix or to the
online Supplementary Material.
2 The model
We study a dynamic congestion game on a general directed network with a single source-
destination pair, where each edge has a transit cost and a capacity. Formally, consider a directed
multigraph G = (V,E), where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a finite set of edges. We then
define a network N = (G , (τe)e∈E, (γe)e∈E), such that for each e ∈ E, the quantities τe ∈ N and
γe ∈ N are the free-flow transit cost and the capacity of edge e, respectively.
A path in the network is a finite sequence of edges (e1, . . . , en) such that the head of ei coincides
with the tail of ei+1 for each i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
We make the following assumptions:
(a) There are two special vertices, the source s, which has only outgoing edges, and the destination
d, which has only incoming edges (we use the symbol d for destination, rather than the more
common t, because we reserve t for time). Source and destination are unique.
(b) For each vertex v ∈ V \ {s, d}, there exists at least a path from s to v and a path from v to d.
We call route a path from s to d. The set of all routes is denoted by R. The above assumptions
guarantee that any path can be extended to a route.
Time is discrete and, at each stage t finitely many players enter the network at the source and
choose a route from s to d. Each player represents a unit packet of traffic. For simplicity, we assume
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that all players have the same size, which we normalize to 1. The dynamics of the model is the
following.
• At each stage t ∈ N+, a finite set Gt of players, called the generation at time t, departs from
the source. For all t ∈ N+ define,
δt = card(Gt) and D = {δt}t∈N+ .
Denote [it] the i-th player in generation Gt (when there is no risk of confusion, the square
brackets are removed).
We thus have an infinite set of players G := ∪tGt. We order this set (anti-lexicographically)
by ⊳ as follows:
[js]⊳ [it] iff s < t or (s = t and j < i).
This order represents priorities: if [js] ⊳ [it] and if these two players enter the edge e at the
same time, then [js] exits e before [it]. Such a global priority is a natural choice for breaking
ties in congestion games, see Farzad et al. (2008) and Werth et al. (2014).
• Each player chooses a route in R.
• At time t player [it] departs from the source s, takes the chosen route, and progresses with
steps of size 1 per unit of time along an edge e. After τe time units, she arrives at the head
of the edge, where a queue may have formed.
• The rules for exiting the queue are the following:
– All players that entered edge e before [it] and those players [js]⊳ [it] who entered e at
the same time as [it] are ahead of [it] in the queue. That is, there is no over-taking in
queues and players are ordered first by time of arrival, then by priority.
– At most γe players can exit e simultaneously. When player [it] arrives at the end of e, if
she finds less than γe players in the queue, then she exits immediately; otherwise, only
the first γe players exit at this stage and player [it] waits for one stage. This process
repeats until there remain less than γe players in the queue ahead of player [it]. Then,
[it] exits edge e and continues along the chosen route.
• The process is repeated until player [it] arrives at the destination d and quits the system.
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These rules define a dynamic congestion game denoted Γ(N ,D). Each strategy profile σ ∈ RG
induces queues on edges. We denote ℓit(σ) the latency suffered by player [it], defined as
ℓit(σ) = cit(σ) + wit(σ),
where cit(σ) :=
∑
e∈rit(σ)
τe is the transit cost paid by player [it] and wit(σ) is the waiting cost paid
by player [it], namely, the total number of stages that [it] spends queueing, summed over the edges
that she crosses. Both costs are additive, the total cost over the route is the sum of costs over the
edges of the route.
We define the total transit cost ct, the total waiting cost wt, and the total latency ℓt at stage t as
follows:
ct(σ) =
∑
[it]∈Gt
cit(σ),
wt(σ) =
∑
[it]∈Gt
wit(σ),
ℓt(σ) =
∑
[it]∈Gt
ℓit(σ) = ct(σ) + wt(σ).
For each integer T , the average total latency over the period {1, . . . , T} is
L¯T (σ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ℓt(σ).
If limT→∞ L¯T (σ) exists, then it is called asymptotic average total latency for the strategy σ.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile σ is (socially) optimal if
lim inf
T→∞
L¯T (σ
′) ≥ lim sup
T→∞
L¯T (σ) for all σ
′ ∈ RG. (2.1)
Call O(N ,D) the set of strategies σ ∈ RG for which (2.1) holds. Then
Opt(N ,D) := lim inf
T→∞
L¯T (σ) = lim sup
T→∞
L¯T (σ) with σ ∈ O(N ,D) (2.2)
is called the optimal latency.
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Definition 2.2. A strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if
ℓit(σ) ≤ ℓit(σ
′
it, σ−it) for all [it] ∈ G, for all σ
′
it ∈ R,
where σ−it indicates the profile of strategies of all players different from [it].
A Nash equilibrium σ is a uniformly fastest route (UFR) equilibrium if for every player [it] and
for every vertex v on the route σit, there is no alternative route σ
′
it that allows player [it] to arrive
at v earlier than under σit.
There is obviously an asymmetry between Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 which stems from the type of
rationality driving the two concepts. An optimal strategy is the choice that a long-lived planner
would like to take, in order to optimize the long-run social welfare. By contrast, an equilibrium is a
strategy profile such that each finitely lived player optimizes her cost given the choices of the other
players.
In non-atomic games (see Koch and Skutella, 2011), the Nash-flow-over-time definition is equiv-
alent to assuming that all particles arrive at each intermediate vertex as early as possible, which is
also equivalent to requiring that no flow overtakes any other flow. For atomic games, this equiva-
lence does not hold. For instance, take a player who is the last in her generation. The immediate
successor is the first in the next generation, and therefore there is a time difference between the
departures of these two subsequent players. In that case, it might be that a player does not want
to arrive at each intermediate vertex as early as possible. It might also be the case that a player
overtakes her predecessor in equilibrium, while arriving at the destination at the same time point.
In fact, the three notions which coincides in the non-atomic case, might yield different long-run
latencies in the atomic case. Example B.5 in the online Supplementary Material illustrates this
phenomenon.
We denote E (N ,D) the set of UFR equilibria of the game Γ(N ,D). We argue that a UFR
equilibrium exists, a similar argument can be found in Werth et al. (2014). In an empty network,
there is always a shortest route with the property that every intermediate vertex is reached as early
as possible, since this is equivalent to the static shortest path problem. If the first player chooses
such a route, then that player cannot be overtaken. Taking this choice into account, the second
player chooses a route that reaches every intermediate vertex as early as possible, so that she cannot
be overtaken either. Continuing this procedure iteratively yields a UFR equilibrium. We present
this result as a lemma whose proof is given in the Appendix for completeness.
Lemma 2.3. The set E (N ,D) is not empty.
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The quantity
WEq(N ,D) := sup
σ∈E (N ,D)
lim sup
T→∞
L¯T (σ) (2.3)
is called the worst equilibrium latency and the quantity
BEq(N ,D) := inf
σ∈E (N ,D)
lim sup
T→∞
L¯T (σ) (2.4)
is called the best equilibrium latency.
3 Socially optimal strategies
In this section we characterize flows and costs generated by optimal strategies. Before stating
the results, a simple observation is that the number of players entering the network over time has
to be compared with the number that the network is able to absorb.
Definition 3.1. A cut in the network N is a subset of edges C ⊆ E such that each route contains
at least one element of C. The capacity of a cut C is γC =
∑
e∈C γe. Call C (N ) the set of all cuts
in N . A minimum cut is a cut C such that
γC ≤ γC′ for all C
′ ∈ C (N ).
The capacity γ of the network N is the capacity of any minimum cut.
Until further notice (see Section 6), we assume that the number of players in each generation
is uniform over time, i.e., δt = δ for all t ∈ N+ (abusing notation, the departure sequence D will
be denoted simply by δ). From the max-flow min-cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1958), if
δ > γ, then the lengths of queues on the edges of the minimum cut diverge to infinity and thus
the long-run average total cost is infinite under any strategy profile. Therefore, in this section, we
assume δ ≤ γ.
We first recall some usual concepts of optimality for static flows over networks. A (static) network
flow f assigns a non-negative flow value fe to each edge e ∈ E (in our setting, these are integers).
The flow f is feasible if it obeys the capacity constraints, i.e., fe ≤ γe for each e ∈ E, and flow
conservation, i.e., the outflow minus the inflow at each vertex v ∈ V \ {s, d} is 0. The value of a
feasible network flow is the inflow at d, in our case this is δ. A static flow may also be defined over
routes. Consider a set of δ players and the routes that they choose. They induce a static flow over
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routes F which assigns to each route r an integer Fr, such that
∑
r∈R Fr = δ. This in turn induces
a flow over edges by letting fe =
∑
{r:e∈r} Fr.
The min-cost flow (static) optimization problem is the minimization of the total transit cost
among all feasible flows with a value of δ. Let f ∗ be an optimal feasible solution and F ∗ a corre-
sponding optimal flow over routes. This is the optimal assignment that a planner would chose in a
static framework with a single set of δ players, subject to feasibility.
Back to the dynamic problem, given a strategy profile σ and a route r, denote N rt (σ) the number
of players who choose route r at stage t under the strategy profile σ.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the game Γ(N , δ), where δ ≤ γ. Let f ∗ be an optimal feasible min-cost
network flow with a value of δ and let F ∗ be the corresponding flow over routes. Then there exists
σ ∈ O(N , δ) such that for each stage t ∈ N+ and route r ∈ R,
N rt (σ) = F
∗
r . (3.1)
This result says that finding the optimal long-run latency boils down to computing a min-cost
static flow. This problem is well studied in the literature and algorithms for solving it efficiently are
known (see, for instance, Ford and Fulkerson, 1962, Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin, 1993, Schrijver,
2003, Korte and Vygen, 2012).
The detailed proof is in the Appendix. The main insight is as follows. Consider first the case of
δ = γ. Since in this case the inflow is equal to the capacity of the network, if the planner violates
the capacity constraints at some stage t, then this creates a queue that will remain through time.
An excess of players on some edge of the min-cut, can only be compensated by a future deficit on
that edge, which entails an excess on some other edge of the min-cut. Consequently, queues can
never be undone and the long-run planner is better-off never creating any queue. When δ < γ
we can consider an augmented network obtained concatenating an edge of capacity δ before the
origin of the original network. The optimum of this augmented network (now at capacity δ) is the
optimum of the original network with a flow δ < γ.
Note that this problem is different from finding an earliest arrival flow, where a given set of
players (or particles) has to be shipped to the destination with the requirement that each particle
arrives as fast as possible (see, for instance, Gale, 1959, Hoppe and Tardos, 2000). Jarvis and Ratliff
(1982) has shown that this is equivalent to the problem of having as many players as possible to
reach the destination in a prescribed amount of time, or to the problem of minimizing the average
time to evacuate the system. In our setting instead, players enter the system infinitely often over
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time, and the goal of the planner is to minimize the average traveling time, which is achieved by
not creating queues.
4 Equilibria for simple network topologies
This section describes the impact of the dynamic nature of the model on equilibrium latencies.
We first consider parallel networks for which we are able to give sharp characterizations of equilibria.
Then, we extend the results to chain-of-parallel networks.
4.1 Parallel networks
In a parallel network, each route contains a single edge (see Figure 1). For such networks, we
can compute exactly the optimum and equilibrium costs for uniform departure inflow (δt = δ for
all t ∈ N+), with δ ≤ γ.
s d
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
Figure 1: Parallel network.
For convenience, we impose an order ≺ on the edges such that their lengths are weakly increasing
along this order: i < j =⇒ ei ≺ ej =⇒ τei ≤ τej .
Observe that a parallel network admits a unique cut and thus its capacity is simply the sum of
the capacities of its edges γ =
∑
e∈E γe.
For each f ∈ E, denote f≺ := {e ∈ E : e ≺ f} and f- := f≺ ∪ {f}, where e≺1 = ∅. For each
δ ≤ γ, there is a unique fδ ∈ E such that∑
e∈f≺
δ
γe < δ ≤
∑
e∈f
-
δ
γe.
14
Define the (sub-)network Nδ with set of edges f
-
δ , such that each edge e ∈ f
≺
δ has transit cost
τe and capacity γe, and edge fδ has transit cost τfδ and capacity δ −
∑
e∈f≺
δ
γe ≤ γfδ . The total
capacity of Nδ is precisely δ.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the game Γ(N , δ), where N is a parallel network and δ ≤ γ. Then
Opt(N , δ) =
∑
e∈f≺
δ
γeτe +
δ − ∑
e∈f≺
δ
γe
 τfδ ,
WEq(N , δ) = δτfδ ,
and there exists a time t0 such that for each t ≥ t0,
N et (σ
Opt) = N et (σ
WEq) = γe for e ≺ fδ and N
fδ
t (σ
Opt) = Nfδt (σ
WEq) = δ −
∑
e∈f≺
δ
γe.
The intuition for the proof is simple. First, it is clear that in a social optimum, the planner
uses only the sub-network Nδ, and from Theorem 3.2, no queues are created. Thus, any optimal
strategy sends exactly γe players on each edge e of Nδ at each stage. Regarding equilibria, the idea
is that the selfish players first fill short edges, thereby creating queues. As a result, the latencies of
these edges increase for future generations, and eventually, all latencies become equal to the highest
transit cost for that (sub)network. From that point on, players are basically indifferent and, as in
an optimal strategies, exactly γe players choose edge e at each stage. The formal proof is in the
Appendix.
4.2 Chain-of-parallel networks
Let N1,N2 be two networks with respective source-destination pairs (s1, d1), (s2, d2). The series
composition of N1 and N2 is the network N = N1 ⊕N2 with source s1, destination d2 and where
d1 and s2 are merged together. A chain-of-parallel network is obtained by composing parallel
networks in series. For h ∈ {1, . . . , H}, let N (h) =
(
E(h), (τe)e∈E(h), (γe)e∈E(h)
)
be a parallel network
and consider the network Nser(H) obtained by composing N
(1), . . . ,N (H) in series. Clearly, any
subnetwork N (h) is a cut of Nser(H). Let N
(∗) be a minimum cut of Nser(H) and let γ
(∗) be the
capacity of N (∗).
We obtain the following characterization for optimal and equilibrium values.
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Theorem 4.2. Consider the game Γ(Nser(H), γ
(∗)). Then
Opt
(
Nser(H), γ
(∗)
)
=
H∑
h=1
Opt
(
N
(h), γ(∗)
)
,
WEq
(
Nser(H), γ
(∗)
)
=
H∑
h=1
WEq
(
N
(h), γ(∗)
)
.
The insights are as follows. First, for optimal strategies the modular structure of the graph
implies that each subnetwork can be analyzed separately in such a way that no queues are created.
Second, modularity implies that the worst equilibrium latency has to be at least the sum of the
worst equilibrium latencies of each subnetwork. The uniformly fastest route property guarantees
that the latency cannot be worse.
The above result may seem straightforward. An important point to consider is that, although the
number of players departing from the source is uniform over time, the number of players who exit
a module may actually be non-uniform (periodic, or even aperiodic), at equilibrium. The following
example illustrates this phenomenon.
Example 4.3. Consider the chain-of-parallel network given in Figure 2, where the capacity of each
edge is 1 and the transit costs are indicated on the edges. The capacity γ(∗) of the network is 2.
s v d
τ
(1)
1 = 1
τ
(1)
2 = 2
τ
(1)
3 = 2
τ
(2)
1 = 1
τ
(2)
2 = 1
Figure 2: Chain-of-parallel network.
Equilibria of this game are described in detail in the online Supplementary Material.
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Consider the following strategy profile.
σ Eqit =

e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [11],
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [21],
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t ≥ 2,
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t ≥ 2.
(4.1)
It is easy to check that this is an equilibrium. The first player [11] takes the fastest route e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 .
The second player [21] cannot pay less than a total cost of 3. She does so by taking e
(1)
1 first and
queuing after [11] (a cost of 2), then taking e
(2)
2 . This choice of the first generation leaves a queue
of size 1 on edge e
(1)
1 for the next generation. The next two players have to pay at least 3 each.
They do so by choosing e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 and e
(1)
2 e
(2)
2 . The queue on edge e
(1)
1 is thus re-created for the next
generation.
The average total latency of this equilibrium is 6. Due to the indifferences, the same average
total latency can be achieved with the following periodic equilibrium strategy profile.
σ˜ Eqit =

e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t odd,
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t odd,
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t even,
e
(1)
3 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t even.
(4.2)
Under this profile, the second player of each odd generation creates a queue on e
(1)
1 . As both
players of the even generation take a long route, none of these two players waits in a queue and
thus the queue on e
(1)
1 disappears. Since the first player in the following odd generation uses the
fast route e
(1)
1 again, she arrives at v at the same time as the previous two players. Therefore, she
waits in the queue on e
(2)
1 . So, the first player of each odd generation waits in the queue on e
(2)
1 ,
and the second player waits on e
(1)
1 (except for the very first player). Therefore, the strategy profile
σ˜ Eq yields an average latency of 6, which is the worst equilibrium latency. However, the queues
vary periodically with time (one can even exploit the indifferences to construct a more complex
equilibrium where queues vary with time in an aperiodic manner).
Even though such periodicities can occur in an UFR equilibrium, we prove that the worst equi-
librium cost can always be obtained with stationary strategies.
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5 Efficiency of equilibria and complex topologies
Efficiency of equilibria is a central issue in the theory of congestion games. Several efficiency
measures have been proposed, among them, the price of anarchy, the price of stability, and the
Braess ratio. Here we use these measures to show how inefficient equilibria can be for dynamic
congestion games, and we look at the possible sources of inefficiencies. We first look at parallel
networks. Then, we consider more complex topologies. In this section, we consider a uniform inflow
in heavy traffic, i.e., δ = γ.
Definition 5.1. Given a game Γ(N , γ),
(a) its price of anarchy is defined as
PoA(N , γ) :=
WEq(N , γ)
Opt(N , γ)
,
(b) its price of stability is defined as
PoS(N , γ) :=
BEq(N , γ)
Opt(N , γ)
,
(c) its Braess ratio BR(N , γ) is defined as the largest factor by which the removal of one or more
edges can improve the latency of traffic in an equilibrium flow.
5.1 Parallel networks
A direct consequence of Theorem 4.1 is a computation of the price of anarchy for parallel networks.
Corollary 5.2. Consider the game Γ(N , γ), where N is a parallel network. Then
PoA(N , γ) ≤
maxe τe
mine τe
.
The inequality is straightforward and shows that the price of anarchy admits an upper bound
the does not depend on capacities but only on the relative lengths of edges. To see that the bound
is tight, consider a parallel network with two parallel edges such that the first is short and wide,
τ1 = 1, γ1 = N
p, where p ∈ N+, and the second is long and narrow, τ2 = N , γ2 = 1. The number
of players per stage is the capacity of the network Np + 1. This instance is similar to the classical
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example of Pigou where in equilibrium, the congestion on the fast edge creates a latency which
matches the latency of the slow edge. The price of anarchy for this network is (Np+1)/(Np−1+1),
which is roughly N = maxe τe/mine τe for p sufficiently large.
5.2 Series-parallel networks
Let N1,N2 be two networks with respective source-destination pairs (s1, d1), (s2, d2). The parallel
composition of N1 and N2 is the network N = N1 ∨N2 where the sources (resp. destinations) of
N1 and N2 are merged together and the set of edges is the disjoint union of E1 and E2. A series-
parallel network is a network which can be obtained by iterated parallel and series compositions of
networks, starting with a network containing only one edge.
The well-known paradox due to Braess (1968, 2005) arises when adding a new edge to a network
increases the worst equilibrium latency. In static games, this paradox can only occur if the networks
contains a Wheatstone subnetwork (see Figure 4), or in other words is not series-parallel (Milchtaich,
2006). Macko et al. (2013) noticed that in non-atomic dynamic congestion games, Braess’s paradox
can arise in networks that are series-parallel.
In dynamic congestion games a different sort of Braess’s paradox can arise: the presence of initial
queues in the network, or increasing the transit costs of an edge may decrease the worst equilibrium
latency. The following example is an adjustment of one of the networks considered in Macko et al.
(2013) .
Example 5.3. Consider the series-parallel network in Figure 3 where the associated free-flow transit
costs and capacities are given. The network has two minimum cuts {e1, e4} and {e2, e3, e4} with a
capacity of 3, and each edge is part of one cut. Deleting one edge would cause the total cost to
explode, thus Braess’s paradox cannot happen in its usual form.
s v d
τ4 = 1
γ4 = 1
τ1 = 0
γ1 = 2
τ3 = 1
γ3 = 1
τ2 = 0
γ2 = 1
Figure 3: Series-parallel network where each edge is part of a minimum cut.
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Consider the following equilibrium strategy.
σ Eqit =

e1e2 for [it] = [11],
e1e3 for [it] = [21],
e1e2 for [it] = [31],
e1e2 for [it] = [1t], t ≥ 2,
e4 for [it] = [2t], t ≥ 2,
e1e3 for [it] = [3t], t ≥ 2.
(5.1)
To verify that this is indeed an equilibrium, the reader is referred to the online Supplementary
Material. The strategy σ Eq yields a latency of 4, which means that the last player of each generation
pays more than the maximum free flow transit costs.
If we have an initial queue of length one on e2, or if we increase the transit cost of e2 from 0 to
1, then in equilibrium one player of each generation chooses e1e2, one player chooses e1e3 and one
player chooses e4. This equilibrium is efficient and the latency is 1 for every player: a paradox!
Recall that this paradox occurs in a network for which no Braess’s paradox is possible in its classical
form. Related paradoxical phenomena have been studied by Daganzo (1998), who showed that, in
a model with physical queues, decreasing the capacity of an edge can improve the equilibrium flow
of a network. Our example shows that this paradox can occur also with point queues that do not
spill over preceding edges.
Notice that Figure 3 corresponds to a series-parallel network considered in Macko et al. (2013),
where the capacity of edge e3 is decreased. So this form of Braess’ paradox may occur in all
series-parallel networks considered in their work.
5.3 Wheatstone networks
One open question is the impact of the multiplicity of equilibria. The following example will
show that for the Wheatstone network, the worst equilibrium has latency costs that are three times
higher than the latency costs of the best equilibrium.
Example 5.4. Consider the Wheatstone network in Figure 4 with associated free-flow transit costs
and capacity equal to 1 for all edges. The capacity of the network is 2.
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sv
d
w
τ2 = 1τ1 = 0
τ4 = 1
τ3 = 0
τ5 = 0
Figure 4: Wheatstone network.
Consider the following UFR equilibrium strategy
σ Eqit =

e1e3e5 for [it] = [i1], i = 1, 2,
e1e3e5 for [it] = [12],
e2e5 for [it] = [22],
e1e3e5 for [it] = [13],
e1e4 for [it] = [23],
e2e5 for [it] = [14],
e1e3e5 for [it] = [24],
e1e4 for [it] = [1t], t ≥ 5,
e2e5 for [it] = [2t], t ≥ 5.
(5.2)
The strategy σ Eq yields a latency of 6. If we remove edge e3 from the network, then the worst
equilibrium latency improves by a factor of three (from 6 to 2) and is equal to the optimum latency
of the network. This appears even more paradoxical than in a static model, since the edge e3 is not
used in equilibrium in steady state.
We can generalize the results of the Wheatstone network by considering Braess’s graphs as defined
by Roughgarden (2006). Using these graphs, we can construct an example where multiple equilibria
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exist, some of them efficient and some others unboundedly bad. Details can be found in the online
Supplementary Material.
Proposition 5.5. For every even integer n, there exists a network N = (G , (τe)e∈E, (γe)e∈E) in
which G has n vertices such that
PoA(N , γ) = BR(N , γ) = n− 1,
PoS(N , γ) = 1.
6 Seasonal inflows on parallel network
In this section, we consider an inflow sequence which is a periodic function of time: there exists
an integer K such that δt+K = δt for all t. Considering parallel networks once more, we provide a
characterization of optimum and equilibrium costs with periodic inflow.
From the max-flow min-cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1958), if the average number of
players (
∑K
k=1 δk)/K exceeds the capacity γ of the network, then the lengths of queues on the edges
of the minimum cut diverge to infinity and thus the long-run average total cost is infinite under any
strategy profile. We assume from now on that γ = 1
K
∑K
k=1 δk.
Let NK(γ) be the set of K-dimensional integer vectors δ = (δ1, . . . , δK) such that
∑K
k=1 δk = γK.
A K-periodic inflow sequence will be identified with a vector δ ∈ NK(γ). We denote Γ(N , K, δ)
the game with K-periodic inflow sequence given by δ.
For each integer p, the total latency over the period {pK + 1, . . . , (p+ 1)K} is
Lp(σ) =
(p+1)K∑
t=pK+1
ℓt(σ).
The average total latency over P periods is
L˜P (σ) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
Lp(σ).
If limP→∞ L˜P (σ) exists, then it is called asymptotic average total latency for the strategy σ.
We want to capture how optimum and equilibrium costs are affected by seasonality. The main
point is that at peak hours, the inflow exceeds the capacity, and therefore queues build up, even if
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all the flow is controlled by the planner. This is exemplified as follows.
Example 6.1. Consider a parallel network having two edges e1, e2 each connecting the source to
the destination. We assume γe1 = γe2 = 1, τe1 = 1 and τe2 = 2. The capacity of the network is thus
2.
Consider the 3-periodic sequence of departures δ = (6, 0, 0). Then, the following strategy profile
that allocates three player per period to each edge is optimal.
σOptit =
e1 for i odd,e2 for i even.
To see it, consider the first two players and send the first one to e1, the second one to e2. Then, the
next two players have to queue at least for one period, so it is as if they had departed one period
later and it is optimal to send one of them to e1 and the other to e2. Now, the remaining two
players have to queue at least two periods, so it is as if they had departed two periods later, and it
is again optimal to send one of them to e1 and the other to e2.
The total latency over a period of time {1, 2, 3} (modulo 3) is 15, that is, 3 times the single-period
optimal total latency that we would have if departures were uniform (2, 2, 2) plus the added cost
of 6 induced by the waiting times: two players pay an extra cost of 1 and two players pay an extra
cost of 2.
Consider now the following equilibrium strategy σ Eq. For t = 1 we let
σ Eqit =
e1 for i = 1 or i even,e2 for i > 2, odd,
therefore the latencies for the first six players are
ℓ11(σ
Eq) = 1, ℓ21(σ
Eq) = 2, ℓ31(σ
Eq) = 2,
ℓ41(σ
Eq) = 3, ℓ51(σ
Eq) = 3, ℓ61(σ
Eq) = 4.
For t ≥ 4 and t = 1 mod 3,
σ Eqit =
e1 for i odd,e2 for i even,
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and
ℓ1t(σ
Eq) = 2, ℓ2t(σ
Eq) = 2, ℓ3t(σ
Eq) = 3,
ℓ4t(σ
Eq) = 3, ℓ5t(σ
Eq) = 4, ℓ6t(σ
Eq) = 4.
It is easy to check that this is an equilibrium. It is constructed in such a way that each player chooses
e1 when he is indifferent between the two edges. This choice makes it the worst equilibrium. In
the steady state, the total equilibrium payoff over a 3-period is 18, that is 3 times the single-period
equilibrium total latency when departures are uniform (2, 2, 2) plus the added cost of 6 induced by
the waiting times.
We define now a quantity that measures the non-uniformity of the inflow. Define the following
binary relation on NK(γ).
Definition 6.2. For any two elements δ, δ′ ∈ NK(γ), we say that δ
′ is obtained from δ by an
elementary operation (denote it δ → δ′), if there exists a stage t such that
δt > γ,
δ′t = δt − 1,
δ′t+1 = δt+1 + 1,
δ′k = δk for k /∈ {t, t+ 1},
where indices are considered modulo K.
Denote γK = (γ, . . . , γ) ∈ NK(γ) the uniform vector. Consider the directed graph representing
the above binary relation → and denote D(δ) the distance in this graph from δ to γK . An ele-
mentary operation δ → δ′ consists in moving one unit from a slot where the capacity is over-filled,
to the next slot. Note that indices are considered modulo K, so this definition is invariant under
circular permutation. Any δ 6= γK has at least one successor in the graph and γK is the only
element with no successor. Then, D(δ) is the minimum number of elementary operations needed
to transform δ into γK . See Figure 5.
Proposition 6.3 below states that the quantity D(δ) measures the total waiting time incurred at
the optimum and at the worst equilibrium by the players due to non-uniform departures.
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1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Figure 5: Operations needed to transform (6, 0, 0) into (2, 2, 2).
Proposition 6.3. Consider the game Γ(N , K, δ), where N is a parallel network and δ ∈ NK(γ).
Then
Opt(N , K, δ) = K
∑
e∈E
γeτe +D(δ),
WEq(N , K, δ) = Kγmax
e∈E
τe +D(δ).
The main idea of the proof is that if δ′ is obtained from δ by an elementary operation, then
the optimum and the worst equilibrium under δ′ are obtained from the optimum and the worst
equilibrium under δ by letting a player postpone her departure by one unit of time. In other words,
since a player departing over capacity has to queue anyhow, it would save one unit of total cost if
this player’s departure were postponed to the next unit of time. The formal proof is in the online
Supplementary Material.
Regarding the impact on efficiency, it is easy to see that the ratio WEq(N , K, δ)/Opt(N , K, δ)
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is decreasing in D(δ). Intuitively, when seasonality is high, the planner has to create queues, and
thus the optimum tends to resemble the equilibrium.
7 Conclusions and open problems
In this paper, we have considered dynamic congestion games with atomic players and common
source-destination pair. We have shown that when the inflow rate is uniform over time and does
not exceed the capacity of the network, an optimal dynamic flow never create queues. This result
is independent of the topology of the network. For special topologies such as parallel network, we
have provided exact computation of optimum and equilibrium costs. An important insight is that
optimum and equilibrium flows eventually coincide, but the transient phase before reaching the
steady state induces an important difference in costs.
We have studied efficiency of equilibria and have shown that the price of anarchy is unbounded,
even for parallel networks. We also found that there exist networks that admit efficient equilibria,
but for which both the price of anarchy and the Braess ratio are arbitrarily large. This shows that
multiplicity of equilibria in atomic games may have a significant impact.
We have shown that several Braess-type paradoxes can occur in atomic dynamic network games.
First of all, we have the usual Braess’s paradox according to which removing an edge from a
network can improve the equilibrium cost. Unlike what happens in static games, this paradox
can occur also in networks that do not include a Wheatstone subnetwork. Moreover, we can have
another paradoxical phenomenon for which initial queues in the network reduce the equilibrium
cost. Alternatively, increasing the transit cost of an edge may reduce the equilibrium cost.
Finally, we have studied the impact of seasonality of inflow by considering parallel networks and
periodic inflow sequences. The main result is that the optimum cost and the equilibrium cost are
shifted upwards by the same amount which is interpreted as a measure of seasonality.
We think of this work as a first attempt to understand atomic dynamic congestion games. Several
problems remain open, among them:
(a) Are queues always bounded in equilibrium? If yes, how much worse can the equilibrium costs
be, compared to the socially optimal costs, and what would be a characterization of this cost
for a given network?
(b) We found a new kind of paradoxical phenomenon: the presence of an initial queue improves
the equilibrium latency. In which networks does such paradox exist? And by how much can
26
the latency improve?
(c) Based on many examples that we have solved numerically, we conjecture that D(δ) is always
an upper bound of the extra equilibrium cost due to seasonality. Is this true?
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A Proofs
Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We prove the existence of a uniformly fastest route equilibrium of the game
Γ(N ,D). Define the strategy profile σ ∈ RG as follows. In an empty network there is always a
shortest route with the property that every intermediate vertex is reached as early as possible, since
that case is equivalent to the static shortest path problem. Let player [11] choose a route with that
property. We define the strategy for each other player [it] iteratively. Given the choices of players
[js] ⊳ [it], let player [it] choose a route such that each intermediate vertex is reached as early as
possible. A slight modification of Dijkstra’s algorithm can be used to compute such path. Let us
argue that the above strategy profile σ is a UFR equilibrium.
By definition of σ, a player [js] does not influence the costs of a player [it] with [it]⊳ [js], since
[js] does not overtake [it]. Hence the latency of a player [it] does not depend on a player [js]
with [it] ⊳ [js]. So player [it] has the same latency value she had when she chose her route. Since
she chose a shortest route with the property that every intermediate vertex is reached as early as
possible, the strategy profile is a UFR equilibrium.
Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We start proving the theorem for the case δ = γ, i.e., when the inflow is at
capacity. The proof starts with two lemmas. The first lemma actually holds for any δ ≤ γ.
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For edge e and each stage t, denote yet (σ) the number of players who enter edge e at stage t under
strategy σ and
y¯eT (σ) =
1
T
∑
t≤T
yet (σ).
Lemma A.1. Let C be a minimum cut and c ∈ C. If a strategy σ is such that lim supT y¯
c
T (σ) > γc,
then lim supT L¯T (σ) = +∞.
Proof. Take a strategy σ, a minimum cut C and an edge c ∈ C such that lim supT y¯
c
T (σ) > γc. Then,
there exists α > 0 and a subsequence {Tk} such that along this subsequence we have y¯
c
Tk
(σ) ≥ γc+α.
Since at most γc players can exit edge c at any given time, this implies that there exists a player
who has a waiting time of w = ⌊αTk/γc⌋. This in turn implies that for each integer s < w, there
exist γc players who have waiting time s. Thus, the total waiting time adds up to at least
γc · (1 + · · ·+ w − 1) =
γc · (w − 1) · w
2
and the average waiting time at stage Tk is such that
w¯Tk(σ) ≥
(⌊αTk/γc⌋ − 1) · ⌊αTk/γc⌋
2Tk
.
The r.h.s. diverges as k →∞, which concludes the proof.
For each stage T and edge e, denote xeT (σ) the number of players who exit edge e at stage T
under strategy σ and
x¯eT (σ) =
1
T
∑
t≤T
xet (σ).
Lemma A.2. If a strategy σ is such that lim supT L¯T (σ) < +∞, then, for any minimum cut C and
c ∈ C, we have
lim
T
y¯cT (σ) = lim
T
x¯cT (σ) = γc.
Proof. Consider such a strategy σ and a minimum cut C. Thanks to Lemma A.1, for each edge
c ∈ C, lim supT y¯
c
T (σ) ≤ γc. If there exists an edge c ∈ C such that lim infT y¯
c
T (σ) < γc, then there
must be another edge c′ ∈ C such that lim supT y¯
c′
T (σ) > γc. This is a consequence of the Ford and
Fulkerson theorem. If for α > 0, y¯cTk(σ) ≤ γc − α along a subsequence {Tk}, then there is a deficit
of players on edge c which has to be compensated by an an excess of players on another edge c′ of
the minimum cut C. As a consequence of Lemma A.1, this results in an unbounded average cost.
28
Finally, if the inflows satisfy
lim
T
y¯cT (σ) = γc, ∀c ∈ C,
then the outflows x¯cT (σ), c ∈ C, satisfy it as well.
We may now conclude the proof of Theorem 3.2 when δ = γ. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 imply that,
to guarantee lim supT L¯T (σ) < +∞, flows have to match capacities on every minimal cut. Thus,
in order to minimize the asymptotic average latency, there should remain no queues, i.e., at the
optimum the total waiting time is zero. A simple way to achieve that is to repeat a static flow with
no queues at each stage. By construction, the min-cost flow f ∗ has a value γ, the capacity of the
network, and satisfies f ∗e ≤ γe for each edge e. Thus, repeating the assignment F
∗ at each stage
yields an asymptotic average latency L∗, which is the value of the min-cost static flow problem. This
is clearly the best that can be achieved without creating queues and therefore this is the optimal
asymptotic average latency. Notice that under this assignment all edges are queue free, not just on
the edges of the minimum cut.
Now, the case δ < γ can be treated by augmenting the network with a fictitious edge f of capacity
δ and length 0, whose tail is the new source and whose head is the old source. This new edge f is
clearly the unique minimum cut of the new network. This way, we obtain a game where the inflow
is at capacity, and so we can apply the first part of the proof. Since the output of f is the input of
the original network, and is constantly δ, the result follows.
Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1. First, by Theorem 3.2, the optimal latency can be computed by sending
the capacity number of players on each edge of the subnetwork Nδ. Hence the result follows.
Second, we show that there exists an equilibrium such that each player pays the transit cost of
τfδ . To simplify notation, the proof below assumes that δ = γ. A similar proof can be given if
δ < γ. Call n the number of edges in E.
We start by defining several times. Let T0 = 0 and, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
Tj =
j∑
k=1
( ∑k
i=1 γi
δ −
∑k
i=1 γi
· (τk+1 − τk)
)
.
Denote T j = ⌊Tj⌋ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Define a strategy profile σ ∈ RG for Γ(N , δ) as follows. For all [it] ∈ G, choose e ∈ E with
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minimum latency, and if there are multiple edges with minimum latency, then choose among these
the first one in the order ≺.
We divide the proof into three parts: (i) stages t with t ≤ T 1, (ii) stages t with T j−1 < t ≤ T j
for j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} and (iii) stages t with t > T n−1. Note that part (ii) is redundant if n = 2.
(i) Each player who sees a queue of size γ1 · (τ2 − τ1) = (δ − γ1) · T1 on e1, faces a waiting cost of
τ2− τ1, and consequently is indifferent between e1 and e2. If all [it] with t < T 1 choose e1, then the
queue on e1 contains (δ − γ1) · T 1 players at the start of stage T 1. Define
α1 = (δ − γ1) · (T1 − T 1).
This is the number of players of GT 1 needed before a player is indifferent between e1 and e2. Since
0 ≤ α1 < (δ − γ1), we know that player [α1 + 1, T 1] sees a queue of size (δ − γ1) · T1· on e1 (and is
indifferent between e1 and e2), and that player [α1 + γ1 + 1, T 1] is the first player to choose e2. In
other words, at all stages t with t < T 1 all players choose e1.
(ii) For j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the following analysis holds true iteratively. Consider the sum of the
queues on e1, . . . , ej that have grown starting from the first player who was indifferent between
e1, . . . , ej onwards. We call this the joint queue of e1, . . . , ej. The joint queue of e1, . . . , ej contains
max{0, δ −
∑j
i=1 γi − αj−1} players at the start of stage T j−1 + 1.
Each player who sees a queue of size
∑j
i=1 γi · (τj+1− τj) = (δ−
∑j
i=1 γi) · (Tj−Tj−1) on the joint
queue of e1, . . . , ej , is indifferent between e1, . . . , ej and ej+1. If all [it] with T j−1 < t < T j choose
one edge in {e1, . . . , ej}, then the joint queue of e1, . . . , ej contains max{0, δ −
∑j
i=1 γi − αj−1} +
(δ −
∑j
i=1 γi) · (T j − T j−1 − 1) players at the start of stage T j. Define
αj =
(
δ −
j∑
i=1
γi
)
· (Tj − T j + T j−1 + 1− Tj−1)−max
{
0, δ −
j∑
i=1
γi − αj−1
}
.
Thus αj is the number of players needed in GT j before a player is indifferent between e1, . . . , ej
and ej+1.
Claim A.3. We have 0 ≤ αj < δ − γ1 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}.
Proof. First, we show that αj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. Notice that if δ −
∑j
i=1 γi − αj−1 ≤ 0,
then the result follows. So assume that δ −
∑j
i=1 γi − αj−1 > 0. We prove by induction that
δ −
∑j
i=1 γi − αj−1 ≤ (δ −
∑j
i=1 γi) · (T j−1 + 1− Tj−1) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}.
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For j = 2,
δ −
2∑
i=1
γi − α1 =
(
δ −
2∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T 1 + 1− T1)− γ2 · (T1 − T 1)
≤
(
δ −
2∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T 1 + 1− T1).
Suppose the inequality holds true for j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}. Then
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi − αj =
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T j − Tj + Tj−1 − T j−1)
− γj+1 · (Tj − T j + T j−1 + 1− Tj−1) + max
{
0, δ −
j∑
i=1
γi − αj−1
}
≤
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T j + 1− Tj)− γj+1 · (Tj − T j)
≤
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T j + 1− Tj),
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
The above result implies
αj ≥
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (Tj − T j) ≥ 0.
Second, we show that αj < δ − γ1 for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. We prove by induction that
δ−
∑j
i=1 γi−αj−1 ≥ (δ−
∑j
i=1 γi)·(T j−1+1−Tj−1)−
∑j
i=2 γi ·(Ti−1−T i−1) for all j ∈ {2, . . . , n−1}.
For j = 2,
δ −
2∑
i=1
γi − α1 =
(
δ −
2∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T 1 + 1− T1)− γ2 · (T1 − T 1).
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Suppose the inequality holds true for j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 2}. Then
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi − αj =
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T j − Tj + Tj−1 − T j−1)
− γj+1 · (Tj − T j + T j−1 + 1− Tj−1) + max
{
0, δ −
j∑
i=1
γi − αj−1
}
≥
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (T j + 1− Tj)−
j+1∑
i=2
γi · (Ti−1 − T i−1),
where the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
The above result implies
αj ≤
(
δ −
j+1∑
i=1
γi
)
· (Tj − T j) +
j+1∑
i=2
γi · (Ti−1 − T i−1) < δ − γ1.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Since 0 ≤ αj < δ−γ1, we know that player [αj+1, T j ] sees a queue of size
∑n
i=j+1 γi · (Tj−Tj−1)·
on the joint queue of e1, . . . , ej (and is indifferent between e1, . . . , ej and ej+1). So, if player [αj +∑j
i=1 γi+1, T j ] exists, then she is the first player to choose ej+1, and if player [αj +
∑j
i=1 γi+1, T j ]
does not exist, then player [
∑j
i=1 γi + 1, T j + 1] is the first player to choose ej+1.
(iii) For all stages t with t > T n−1, player [1t] faces a latency of τn on each e ∈ E and therefore is
indifferent between e1, . . . , and en. So the first γ1 players choose e1, the second γ2 players choose
e2, . . . , and the last γn players choose en. This implies no additional queue is created during this
stage. Since at most γ players arrive at each stage, individual costs cannot become higher than τn.
Third, notice that both in the socially optimal strategy and the worst equilibrium flows on each
edge of the subnetwork Nδ are eventually equal to capacity.
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B Supplementary material
Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Optimum. It is clear that a minimum cut of Nser(H) is a subnetwork N
(h)
with minimum capacity. Denote N (∗) such a minimum cut of Nser(H) and γ
(∗) its capacity which
is also the capacity of the whole network Nser(H). If the size of each generation is δ = γ
(∗), then
each subnetwork N (h) has a capacity at least δ. Thus, the planner can choose the global flow in
order to minimize the cost on each subnetwork separately, which is clearly the best achievable total
cost.
Equilibrium. Consider againN (∗), a minimum cut ofNser(H) with capacity γ
(∗). First, we show that
there is an equilibrium with corresponding latency equal to the sum of the worst latencies of each
module. Consider the subnetwork N (1). The worst equilibrium cost on N (1) with corresponding
strategy profile is given by Theorem 4.1. Now, from the structure of this equilibrium, from some
time onwards, there are γ(∗) players outgoing from N (1) at each stage. Since the output of N (1) is
at most γ(∗) in earlier stages, the long-run worst equilibrium cost for the next modules is the same
as under a constant inflow of γ(∗). Hence the latency of this equilibrium is the sum of the worst
latencies of each module.
Second, we show that the sum of the worst latencies is the worst equilibrium latency for this
network. If the inflow of each module is constant from some point onwards, then the above equilib-
rium is the worst equilibrium. The UFR property assures that within each module an equilibrium
is played. Therefore, on each (sub)module, costs are at most the maximum transit costs.
However, a module N (h) with a capacity larger than γ(∗) is able to produce a non-uniform outflow.
As long as this outflow is below γ(∗), the latency of the following module N (h+1) is at most the
worst latency of N (h+1). Let t∗ be the first period in which the outflow of N (h) is above γ(∗). Each
player that departs after γ(∗) players already departed (potentially) faces an additional queue in
N (h+1). However, in order to obtain an outflow above γ(∗), players from two different generations
must leave at the same moment. This implies that all players from the second generation have a
latency which is one unit below the latency of the first generation. So the additional queue that
will be created in N (h+1) is offset by the decrease in latency in N (h). A similar idea applies to
subsequent periods in which this additional queue is maintained. Hence overall the equilibrium
latency cannot be worse than the sum of the worst latencies.
Details of Example 4.3. Consider the chain-of-parallel network given in Figure 6, where the capacity
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of each edge is 1 and the transit costs are indicated on the edges. The capacity γ(∗) of the network
is 2.
s v d
τ
(1)
1 = 1
τ
(1)
2 = 2
τ
(1)
3 = 2
τ
(2)
1 = 1
τ
(2)
2 = 1
Figure 6: Chain-of-parallel network.
s v d e(1)1 , e
(2)
1
s v d e(1)1 , e
(2)
2
s v d e(1)2 , e
(2)
1
s v d e(1)2 , e
(2)
2
s v d e(1)3 , e
(2)
2
Figure 7: Route color code.
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Consider the following strategy profile.
σ Eqit =

e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [11],
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [21],
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t ≥ 2,
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t ≥ 2.
(B.1)
s v d
[11][21]
t = 2
s v d [11]
[21]
[12]
[22] t = 3
s v d [21]
[12]
[22]
[13]
[23] t = 4
s v d [22][12]
[13]
[23]
[14]
[24] t = 5
s v d [23][13]
[14]
[24]
[15]
[25] t = 6
Figure 8: Example 4.3, equilibrium (B.1)
Figure 8 shows that this is an equilibrium. The first player [11] takes the fastest route e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 .
The second player [21] cannot pay less than a total cost of 3. She does so by taking e
(1)
1 first and
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queuing after [11] (a cost of 2), then taking e
(2)
2 . This choice of the first generation leaves a queue
of size 1 on edge e
(1)
1 for the next generation. The next two players have to pay at least 3 each.
They do so by choosing e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 and e
(1)
2 e
(2)
2 . The queue on edge e
(1)
1 is thus re-created for the next
generation.
The same average total latency of 6 can be achieved with the following periodic equilibrium
strategy profile (see Figure 9).
σ˜ Eqit =

e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t odd,
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t odd,
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t] and t even,
e
(1)
3 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [2t] and t even.
(B.2)
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s v d
[11][21]
t = 2
s v d [11]
[21]
[12]
[22]
t = 3
s v d
[13][12]
[21]
[22]
[13]2
t = 4
s v d [22][12]
[13]
[23]
[14]
[24]
t = 5
s v d [23][13]
[15][14]
[24]
[25]
t = 6
s v d [24][14]
[15]
[25]
[16]
[26]
t = 7
Figure 9: Example 4.3, equilibrium (B.2)
Under this profile, the second player of each odd generation creates a queue on e
(1)
1 . As both
players of the even generation take a long route, none of these two players waits in a queue and
thus the queue on e
(1)
1 disappears. Since the first player in the following odd generation uses the
fast route e
(1)
1 again, she arrives at v at the same time as the previous two players. Therefore, she
waits in the queue on e
(2)
1 . So, the first player of each odd generation waits in the queue on e
(2)
1 ,
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and the second player waits on e
(1)
1 (except for the very first player).
Section 5
Details of Example 5.3. Consider the series-parallel network in Figure 10 where the associated
free-flow transit costs and capacities are given. The network has two minimum cuts {e1, e4} and
{e2, e3, e4} with a capacity of 3, and each edge is part of one cut.
s v d
τ4 = 1
γ4 = 1
τ1 = 0
γ1 = 2
τ3 = 1
γ3 = 1
τ2 = 0
γ2 = 1
Figure 10: Series-parallel network where each cut is a minimum cut.
Consider the following equilibrium strategy.
σ Eqit =

e1e2 for [it] = [11],
e1e3 for [it] = [21],
e1e2 for [it] = [31],
e1e2 for [it] = [1t], t ≥ 2,
e4 for [it] = [2t], t ≥ 2,
e1e3 for [it] = [3t], t ≥ 2.
(B.3)
To verify that this is indeed an equilibrium, the reader is referred to Figures 11 and 12.
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s v d e1, e2
s v d e1, e3
s v d e4
Figure 11: Route color code
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s v d[31]
[21]
[11] t = 1
s v d[32]
[22]
[12]
[31],[21] t = 2
s v d[33]
[23]
[13]
[32]
[22],[12] t = 3
s v d[34]
[24]
[14]
[33]
[23],[13],[32] t = 4
s v d[35]
[25]
[15]
[34]
[24],[14],[33] t = 5
Figure 12: Equilibrium (B.3).
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Details of Example 5.4. Consider the Wheatstone network in Figure 13 with associated free-flow
transit costs and capacity equal to 1 for all edges. The capacity of the network is 2.
s
v
d
w
τ2 = 1τ1 = 0
τ4 = 1
τ3 = 0
τ5 = 0
Figure 13: Wheatstone network.
s
v
d
w
e1, e4
s
v
d
w
e1, e3, e5
s
v
d
w
e2, e5
Figure 14: Wheatstone network color code.
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Consider the following equilibrium strategy
σ Eqit =

e1e3e5 for [it] = [i1], i = 1, 2,
e1e3e5 for [it] = [12],
e2e5 for [it] = [22],
e1e3e5 for [it] = [13],
e1e4 for [it] = [23],
e2e5 for [it] = [14],
e1e3e5 for [it] = [24],
e1e4 for [it] = [1t], t ≥ 5,
e2e5 for [it] = [2t], t ≥ 5.
(B.4)
We refer to Figure 15 to check that this is indeed an equilibrium.
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sv
d
w
[11]
[21]
t = 1
s
v
d
w
[22]
[12]
[21]
t = 2
s
v
d
w
[23],[13]
[22]
[12]
t = 3
s
v
d
w
[14]
[24],[23]
[13]
[22]
t = 4
s
v
d
w
[25]
[15],[24]
[23]
[14]
[13]
t = 5
s
v
d
w
[26]
[16],[15]
[25],[24]
[14],[23]
t = 6
s
v
d
w
[27]
[17],[16]
[26],[25]
[15]
[24]
t = 7
s
v
d
w
[28]
[18],[17]
[27],[26]
[16]
[25],[15]
t = 8
s
v
d
w
[29]
[19],[18]
[28],[27]
[17]
[26],[16]
t = 9
Figure 15: Wheatstone network equilibrium (B.4).
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Proof of Proposition 5.5. For k ∈ N+, define Braess’s k-th graph as follows. Since this is just a
graph and not a multigraph, edges are uniquely identified by their tail and head. Let
V k = {s, v1, . . . , vk, w1, . . . , wk, d}
be the set of 2k + 2 vertices and
Ek = {(s, vi), (vi, wi), (wi, d) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(vi, wi−1) | 2 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(v1, d)} ∪ {(s, wk)}
the set of edges. See Figure 16.
s
v1
v2 vk
wk
w1 wk−1
d
. . .
. . .
Figure 16: Braess’s k-th graph.
Let γe = 1 for all e ∈ E
k and
τe =
1 if e = (v1, d), e = (s, wk) or e = (vi, wi−1) for 2 ≤ i ≤ k,0 otherwise,
Notice that Braess’s k-th graph has a capacity k + 1.
51
For i = 1, . . . , k, let Pi denote the path (s, vi)(vi, wi)(wi, d). Let Q1 denote the path (s, v1)(v1, d),
for i = 2, . . . , k let Qi denote the path (s, vi)(vi, wi−1)(wi−1, d) and let Qk+1 denote the path
(s, wk)(wk, d).
The optimal latency is achieved by the strategy profile in which each player of every generation
chooses a different path Qi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1. Hence
Opt(N , γ) = k + 1.
Consider the subnetwork N ′ obtained from N by deleting each edge (vi, wi) for i = 1, . . . , k.
Observe that N ′ is a parallel network and the unique equilibrium latency is achieved by the strategy
profile in which each player of every generation chooses a different path Qi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1.
Hence
WEq(N ′, γ) = k + 1.
Now, on N the best equilibrium latency is achieved by the following strategy profile.
(i) In the j-th period, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the first k+1− j players choose path Pi for i = 1, . . . , k
in increasing order and players k+2−j, . . . , k+1 choose path Qk+2−j, . . . , Qk+1, respectively.
(ii) From period k + 1 onwards, each player chooses a path Qi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1 in increasing
order.
Since no queue is created in any of the periods,
BEq(N , γ) = k + 1.
The worst equilibrium latency is achieved by the following strategy profile. For all [it] ∈ G,
choose a path pit with minimum latency that has no possibility of overtaking, according to the
following preference relation over paths P1 ≻ . . . ≻ Pk ≻ Q1 ≻ Qk+1 ≻ Q2 ≻ . . . ≻ Qk. The idea is
that the players in the transient states create queues on each Pi for i = 1, . . . , k, in such a way that
in the steady state, in each generation exactly one player chooses the path Qi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1,
with a latency of 2k + 1. For k = 1, this strategy profile is illustrated in Example 5.4. For k ≥ 2,
queues grow as follows.
(i) In the first k periods, each player chooses a path Pi for i = 1, . . . , k in increasing order such
that after k periods, each edge (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k has a waiting cost of one.
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(ii) Partition the following (k−1) ·2k periods into k−1 sets of 2k periods. Each set of 2k periods
consists of two subsets of k periods such that players in the second k periods choose the same
routes as players in the first k periods. During the j-th set of 2k periods, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k−1,
all players in the first k − j periods choose a path Pi for i = 1, . . . , k in increasing order and
create a queue on (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k− j. In the next j periods, the UFR property implies
that a path Pi is replaced by a path Qi+1 for i = k, . . . , k + 1− j such that a queue grows on
(wi, d) instead of on (s, vi).
So during the j-th set of 2k periods, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, the queue on each edge (s, vi) for
i = 1, . . . , k − j has increased by two, and the queue on (wi, d) for i = k, . . . , k + 1 − j has
increased by two.
(iii) After (k − 1) · 2k + k periods, the length of the queue on each edge (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k is
2 · (k − i) + 1, and the length of the queue on each edge (wi, d) for i = 2, . . . , k is 2 · (i − 1).
The UFR property implies that in the following k periods a queue grows on each edge (wi, d)
for i = 1, . . . , k.
(iv) The subsequent k + 1 periods are summarized as follows. First, a queue grows on (s, v1),
then a queue grows on (s, vi) and (wi−1, d) for i = 2, . . . , k, finally a queue grows on (wk, d).
Summarizing, each path Pi for i = 1, . . . , k has a latency of 2k + 2 and each path Qi for
i = 1, . . . , k + 1 has a latency of 2k + 1.
(v) In all of the upcoming periods, each player chooses a different path Qi for i = 1, . . . , k + 1.
The UFR property guarantees that queues cannot grow any further.
Hence
WEq(N , γ) = (k + 1) · (2k + 1).
Concluding, we found that
PoS(N , γ) =
k + 1
k + 1
= 1,
PoA(N , γ) = BR(N , γ) =
(k + 1) · (2k + 1)
(k + 1)
= 2k + 1 = n− 1.
Remark B.1. For the k-th Braess’s graph, the Nash latency of the non-atomic game is achieved by
the following strategy profile. First, a queue of length one is created on each (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k.
Then congestion occurs on each (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 and (wk, d) until there is an additional
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queue of one. This process, where more queues grow on (wi, d) instead of on (s, vi) for i = 1, . . . , k,
continues until each path has the same latency equal to k + 1. Hence the non-atomic game has a
price of anarchy of n/2.
Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.3. We first prove the formula for the optimum cost,
Opt(N , K, δ) = K
∑
e∈E
γeτe +D(δ).
We prove this result by induction on D(δ). For D(δ) = 0, note that δ = γ and the result is obvious.
Suppose the result is true for δ′ with D(δ′) ∈ N and let δ → δ′. Since δ → δ′, there is some
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that δk > γ, δ
′
k = δk − 1, δ
′
k+1 = δk+1 + 1 and δ
′
ℓ = δℓ for all ℓ /∈ {k, k + 1},
where k + 1 is considered modulo K.
At each stage tk such that t = k mod K, players depart above capacity under δ. This implies
that there is at least one player [jtk] who sees a queue on his route, and thus who adds one unit of
waiting time to the total cost. Denote [j∗tk] such a player with the highest index, i.e., the player
with the lowest priority. Consider the relaxed optimization problem where the planner postpones
the departure of this player by one stage and let her depart as the first player of the next generation,
that is, to transform δ into δ′.
By the choice of j∗ (the last one in the generation who sees a queue), the postponing of this
player does not affect the costs nor the choices of the other players. This is clear for those who have
higher priority. For those who have lower priority, this player will be ahead of them in the queue
in both cases. So the choice of strategy for player [j∗tk] that has to be made by the social planner
is the same in δ as in δ′. Hence all players, including player [j∗tk], choose the same strategy, and
thus in each period, one unit of waiting cost is saved by postponing the departure of player [j∗tk].
This concludes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of the formula for the equilibrium. We start by showing some prelimi-
nary results. The first claim shows that for computing equilibrium costs, without loss of generality
all capacities can be assumed to be 1.
Let N = (G , (τe)e∈E, (γe)e∈E) be a network. Given e ∈ E, let N
e be the network obtained from
N by replacing the edge e of capacity γe, by a set E(e) of γe parallel edges of capacity 1, with the
same head and tail, and same length as e.
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Claim B.2. Every equilibrium of N (resp. N e) can be mapped to an equilibrium of N e (resp.
N ) with the same total cost.
Proof. We index the γe edges E(e) by the integers {1, . . . , γe}. We consider an equilibrium σ of N
and construct an equilibrium of N e with the same total cost.
Suppose that under σ, at generation t, n players numbered [i1t], . . . , [int] enter edge e.
First assume that there is no initial queue on e at the beginning of stage t. For each k = 1, . . . , n,
assign player [ikt] to the q-th edge if k = q mod γe. In words, take those n players and assign them
to the edges according to their priority, following the numbering of edges: player [i1t] is assigned to
edge 1, . . . , player [ikt] is assigned to edge k for k ≤ γe. If n > γe, then player [iγe+1t] is assigned
to edge 1, and so on. By construction, both ways, player [ikt] will queue on e if k > γe, and if
k = wγe + r (w, r integers, r < γe), player [ikt] will queue for w − 1 units of time. Therefore the
total cost paid by this player on e is the same in both cases. This defines an equilibrium for those
players: there is no point in deviating to a route feasible in N , as it would imply a profitable
deviation from σ. By construction, each player is assigned to an edge of E(e) which is fastest, given
the priorities.
With this construction, the queues left by this generation to the next one has the following
structure: there exist w and q∗ ≤ γe such that all edges of E(e) numbered 1, . . . , q
∗ have a queue
of length w, and edges numbered q∗ + 1, . . . , γe have a queue of length w − 1 (if q
∗ = γe, all queues
have the same length).
Second, suppose again that at generation t, n players numbered [i1t], . . . , [int] enter edge e under
σ, but that on E(e), they see queues with the above structure. If q∗ < γe, then let the first γe − q
∗
players fill the edges numbered q∗ + 1, . . . , γe in an orderly fashion, according to priorities. The
remaining n− (γe− q
∗) choose edges as in the previous case: the first player chooses the first edge,
and so on.
As in the previous case, since the choice of edges in E(e) respects the priorities, the waiting time
is the same for each player on both networks. Also for the same reason as in the previous case, this
is an equilibrium choice. Note that the above structure of queues is preserved from one generation
to the next, so that the analysis can be iterated. We have thus constructed an equilibrium of N e
with the same total cost as σ.
Conversely, take an equilibrium σe of N e. For each route in N e that uses an edge f ∈ E(e),
there is a unique corresponding route in N which uses edge e. This maps uniquely the strategy
profile σe in a strategy profile σ on N . Then σ has to be an equilibrium. Actually, a deviation in
N is also feasible in N e, so a profitable deviation from σ would imply a profitable deviation from
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σe.
From the fact that σe is an equilibrium of N e, the queues on the edges of E(e) (if at all) must
have a structure as above, there is an integer w such that each edge in an non-empty subset of E(e)
has a queue of length w, and all other edges in E(e) have a queue of length w − 1. Therefore, the
waiting time of a player on edge e is the same as on E(e).
Applying this result iteratively we can transform any network into another where all capacities
are one.
Lemma B.3. Let N be a parallel network. In a worst equilibrium of Γ(N ,D), whenever a player
is indifferent between several edges, she chooses one where there is a queue, if there is one.
Proof. Using Claim B.2, we assume that all capacities are one. For a parallel network, arriving at
intermediary nodes is not an issue. Therefore, each generation of players chooses an equilibrium as
in a game where no subsequent generations exist. More precisely, consider a parallel network with
edges e ∈ E and lengths (τe)e∈E . Consider the game where at stage 1 a generation of δ players enter
the network and where there are no subsequent players. DenoteW (δ, (τe)e∈E) the worst equilibrium
total cost of this game.
Claim B.4. W (δ, (τe)e∈E) is weakly increasing in free-flow transit costs. That is, if, for all e ∈ E,
τe ≤ τ
′
e, then W (δ, (τe)e∈E) ≤W (δ, (τ
′
e)e∈E).
Proof. Since we are dealing with just one generation, we denote the players 1, . . . , δ. Take an
equilibrium σ and let ℓi(σ) be the equilibrium latency of player i. A simple remark is that ℓi(σ)
weakly increases with i and that from one player to the next, it can only increase by one unit.
Precisely, there exist integers 1 ≤ k1 < k2 < · · · < kn ≤ δ such that
• whenever 1 ≤ i ≤ k1, we have ℓi(σ) = mine τe,
• if 1 ≤ m < n, then, whenever km < i ≤ km+1, we have ℓi(σ) = mine τe +m.
To see this, note first that if i < j, then ℓi(σ) ≤ ℓj(σ). Otherwise, player i who has priority over
j could profitably imitate j. Second, ℓi+1(σ) ≤ ℓi(σ) + 1. Otherwise, player i + 1 could profitably
imitate i and pay ℓi(σ) + 1.
If follows directly that if we increase mine τe, then the equilibrium costs of all players are pushed
(weakly) upwards. Suppose now that we increase by one unit the length of an edge which is used
in equilibrium. That is, take an edge f with length τf = mine τe +m for some m, with 1 ≤ m < n
as above, and replace it by an edge with length τf + 1. In this new situation, we have the same
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number of players who pay τf −1 at most. Among the players who paid τf in the old situation, one
has to pay now τf +1 (the one with the lowest priority; whether she chooses edge f or another one
with the same total cost). Subsequent players have to pay weakly more. So, all costs are weakly
pushed upwards.
Consider now a worst equilibrium of Γ(N ,D). The first generation chooses an equilibrium for
the network with lengths (τe)e∈E. Let n1(e) be the number of players of the first generation who
choose edge e. If n1(e) ≤ 1, then the first generation leaves no queue on e for the next one. If
n1(e) > 1, then the first player in the second generation meets a queue of r1(e) = n1(e)− 1 on edge
e. Iteratively, let nt(e) denote the number of players of generation t who choose edge e and rt(e)
the queue that the first player in generation t + 1 meets on e. We have the following recursion for
t > 1,
rt(e) = (rt−1(e) + nt(e)− 1)+,
where x+ = max{x, 0}.
Then, generation t + 1 chooses an equilibrium for the network (τ t+1e )e∈E with τ
t+1
e := τe + rt(e).
Now, suppose that there is a generation t, a player [it] and two edges e, f such that player [it]
is indifferent between e and f and, there is a queue on e but not on f . There are two equilibrium
scenarios. In the best scenario (BS) player [it] chooses f , in the worst scenario (WS) player [it]
chooses e. We argue that the queues left for future generations are all weakly higher in WS than
in BS.
Consider first the case where player [it] is the last in generation t. Then by choosing f , she leaves
no queue on f for the next generation and the queue on e decreases by one unit. If she chooses e,
she recreates the queue on e, there is still no queue on f . For all other edges, the queue is the same
under both scenarios.
The second case is when player [it] is not the last in her generation. Let p = δt − i + 1 be the
number of players who come weakly after player i in generation t, and let q be the number of edges
that have the same total cost as e for player [it]. If p > q, then one player must choose e and
another one must choose f , no matter what player [it] does, so the queues are the same under both
scenarios. If p ≤ q, then at most one player will choose f (so no queue is created there) and no
player chooses the same edge as [it]. Therefore, if she chooses e she maintains the queue there,
whereas she creates no queue by choosing f .
We conclude that whenever a player is indifferent between queuing or not, choosing the edge
with the queue weakly increases all queues for the next generation. From the recursion rt(e) =
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(rt−1(e) + nt(e)− 1)+, this weakly increases queues for all future generations. From Claim B.4, the
conclusion follows.
We now turn to the proof of the formula for the equilibrium,
WEq(N , K, δ) = Kγmax
e∈E
τe +D(δ).
We prove it by induction on D(δ), the result being obvious for D(δ) = 0. We assume that the
result is true for δ′ with D(δ′) ∈ N and let δ → δ′. We take k ∈ {1, . . . , K} such that δk > γ,
δ′k = δk − 1, δ
′
k+1 = δk+1 + 1 and δ
′
ℓ = δℓ for all ℓ /∈ {k, k+ 1}, where k + 1 is considered modulo K.
First, we show that there is an equilibrium for Γ(N , K, δ) with costs equal toWEq(N , K, δ′)+1.
This implies that WEq(N , K, δ) ≥ WEq(N , K, δ′) + 1.
Let σ′ be the strategy profile as defined for Γ(N , K, δ′) yielding the worst equilibrium latency.
We construct a strategy profile σ for Γ(N , K, δ) corresponding to σ′ such that the same queues are
created. The definition of the strategy is iterative. We indicate below how the construction works
for one period and how the iteration proceeds to the next.
(I) Let k < K and t ∈ N. If t < k, then let each player [it] choose the same edge as in σ′. If
t = k, then let each player [it] with i < δk choose the same edge as in σ
′.
(1) If the edge chosen by player [1, k + 1] in σ′ has minimum latency and waiting costs for
player [δkk], then let [δkk] choose this edge and let each player [it] with t < k+K choose
the same edge as in σ′. In this case, bringing forward a player does not affect the choice
of the other players, because for them there is no difference whether the player waits
a stage in a queue or whether the player waits a stage to depart. From stage k + K
onwards, go to (I) and iterate.
(2) If the edge chosen by player [1, k+1] in σ′ has either no minimum latency or no waiting
costs for player [δkk], then let [δkk] choose an edge with minimum latency and no waiting
costs (observe that in the former case, the edge has waiting costs and thus there must be
a different edge with minimum latency but no waiting costs) and let each player [i, k+1]
with i ≤ δk+1 choose the same edge as in σ
′.
(a) Either there is a first generation Gs with k + 1 ≤ s < k + K which has a last
player with no waiting costs in σ′. Let each player [it] with k + 1 < t ≤ s choose
the same edge as the player departing before [it] in σ′ and let each player [it] with
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s < t < k +K choose the same edge as in σ′. In this case, [δ′ss] does not affect the
other players in σ′. So it is no problem if he does not depart. From stage k + K
onwards, go to (I).
(b) Or all generations Gt with k + 1 ≤ t < k +K have a last player with waiting costs
in σ′, then let each player [it] with k + 1 < t ≤ k +K choose the same edge as the
player departing before [it] in σ′. From stage k +K + 1 onwards, go to (II).
(II) Let k = K and t ∈ N. Let each player [i1] with i ≤ δk choose the same edge as in σ
′.
(1) Either, there is a first generation Gs with 1 ≤ s < K which has a last player with no
waiting costs in σ′. Let each player [it] with 1 < t ≤ s choose the same edge as the player
departing before [it] in σ′ and let each player [it] with s < t < K choose the same edge
as in σ′. In this case, [δ′ss] does not affect the other players in σ
′. So it is no problem if
she does not depart. From stage K onwards, go to (I).
(2) Or, all generations Gt with 1 ≤ t < K have a last player with waiting costs in σ
′, then
let each player [it] with 1 < t ≤ K choose the same edge as the player departing before
[it] in σ′. From stage K + 1 onwards, go to (II).
Notice that σ is defined in such a way that queues have the same length as under σ′, either at
the beginning or at end of stage k + K . Queues have the same length at the beginning of stage
k+K in cases where the algorithm goes to (I), and queues have the same length at the end of stage
k +K in cases where the algorithm goes to (II).
Now, in order to compute the long-run latency, let us focus on the steady state. We know that
with uniform departures there is a t0 such that for all generations t ≥ t0, queues are such that γe
players choose edge e for all e ∈ E. Recall that δk > γ. By construction, for each generation t = k
mod K, where t ≥ t0 +K, and for all edges e at least γe players choose e. This implies that player
[δkt] must wait for at least one period. So the waiting costs for [δkt] increases by one unit compared
to σ′.
Second, we show that there is an equilibrium of Γ(N , K, δ′) with costs equal toWEq(N , K, δ)−1.
This implies that WEq(N , K, δ) ≤ WEq(N , K, δ′) + 1.
Fix a worst equilibrium σ of Γ(N , K, δ) and consider stage k. Since δk > γ, queues must be
created on some edges. Let i∗ be the maximal index such that player [i∗k] meets a queue under σ.
Then, by the choice of i∗, it must be that each subsequent player meets no queue. Further, each
such player pays the same cost as [i∗k]. Indeed, if for j > i∗, player [jk] pays less than [i∗k], then
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[i∗k] has a profitable deviation by imitating [jk]. If [jk] pays more than [i∗k], then she would meet
a queue. Recall from Lemma B.3 that in a worst equilibrium, in case of indifference, players choose
an edge with a queue over an edge without a queue. So [jk] would imitate [i∗k], paying the cost of
[i∗k] plus 1. This contradicts the definition of i∗.
Now, consider the game where [i∗k] is postponed by one stage, starting as the first player of the
next generation. In this game, if the postponed player chooses the exact same strategy, she pays
one unit less, since queues have decreased by one. She cannot pay less than that, since that would
have offered a profitable deviation for [i∗k] in the original game. So it is an equilibrium. Since the
two situations are identical for all other players, this reasoning can be iterated at each period.
Hence, combining the previous two results yields
WEq(N , K, δ) = WEq(N , K, δ′) + 1,
= WEq(N , K, γ) +D(δ′) + 1,
= WEq(N , K, γ) +D(δ),
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis.
Nash equilibria
The following example shows that there are Nash (but not UFR) equilibria for chain-of-parallel
networks, where players may end up paying strictly more than the cost of the costlier route. The
reason is that in a Nash equilibrium players need not arrive at intermediate vertices as early as
possible and this may create additional queues.
Example B.5. Consider the chain-of-parallel network in Figure 17 with associated free-flow transit
costs and capacity equal to 1 for all edges. The capacity γ(∗) of the network is 2.
s v d
τ
(1)
1 = 1
τ
(1)
2 = 2
τ
(2)
1 = 1
τ
(2)
2 = 2
Figure 17: Chain-of-parallel network.
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Consider the following equilibrium strategy profile
σ Eqit =

e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [1t], t ≤ 2,
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [2t], t ≤ 2,
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [13],
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [23],
e
(1)
2 e
(2)
2 for [it] = [1t], t ≥ 4,
e
(1)
1 e
(2)
1 for [it] = [2t], t ≥ 4,
In the first two periods a queue of length two is created on e
(1)
1 . Note that player [22] cannot be
overtaken as the next player departs in the following period. In period three, a new queue starts
on e
(2)
1 and in stage four we reach the steady state.
The latency of this strategy profile equals 9, which means that the last player of each generation
pays more than the maximum free-flow transit costs.
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